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CRITICAL COLLECTION PROBLEMS COMMITTEE

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
29 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR D/DCI/NIPE

SUBJECT: Report on CCPC Activities in 1969-70

As requested by Mr. Parrott's memorandum, forwarded herewith is a summary of the CCPC reports and activities which might be included in the DCI report to the PFIAB.

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Major General, USAF (Ret.)
Chairman

Attachment: a/s

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
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Summary of

CCPC Reports and Activities - 1969-1970

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
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Cuba

a. On 18 December 1968, NIRB requested the CCPC to identify all collection, processing and intelligence production activities which are directed against Cuba and against Cuban targets in third countries. After review of the resultant study [redacted] ((CCPC-D-10/69))), the NIRB asked the CCPC for an assessment of the impact of a one-third and a one-half reduction in all of our intelligence coverage of Cuba, and the costs, fiscal and security,

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which might be involved as well as an estimate of the extent of ELINT coverage of Cuba considered necessary for intelligence purposes. The NIRB further requested more detailed costing of intelligence and support activities.

b. The supplemental report was forwarded to the NIRB on 23 December 1969. (CCPC-D-32/69 [redacted] 25X1

22 December 1969.) It pointed out that a considerable amount of our intelligence effort against Cuba is based upon U.S. commanders' contingency plans which call for a quick-reaction military capability against Cuba. As a result of NIRB action on this report, the continuing requirement for a quick-response military capability was reviewed within DoD and some adjustments in photo coverage requirements were made. 25X1

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
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Vietnam Program Budget

a. In April 1970, a national intelligence program budget was prepared as a part of a government-wide effort to develop a Vietnam Program Budget in response to NSSM-77. The report was limited to those U.S. intelligence activities for which tasking originates at the U.S. national level, and/or which by their special nature are of particular interest to Departments and Agencies in Washington. (Intelligence resources directly associated with combat forces or with lower echelons of SVN

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government operations within Vietnam were developed by the NSC Staff in other sections of the overall Program Budget.)


b. The CCPC report listed intelligence costs incurred in Vietnam and that portion of those costs for operations and programs conducted by U.S. overseas intelligence activities outside of Vietnam which can be attributed to the Vietnam problem. CONUS expenditures were not included, with the exception of funding for certain activities in Hawaii which directly support the Vietnam war effort.

c. The report was forwarded to Mr. Kissinger by Mr. Helms on 3 August 1970. b ((CCPC-D-29/70)) 25X1
10 July 1970.)

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Intelligence Base Plan for the WestPac Area

The NIRB assigned to the CCPC responsibility for developing an Intelligence Base Plan for the Western Pacific for the years 1972-1976 to be part of but distinct from an overall military base plan for the area being prepared for the DPRC.

As a first step in the development of the plan, the CCPC compiled a statement of intelligence objectives and needs for the area for the period under study. (USIB-D-64.6/52 ((CCPC-D-32/70)) of 28 August 1970.) This statement and its use were noted by the

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USIB on 18 September 1970. The objective is to relate the targeting of our current collection functions/facilities to these intelligence needs as projected through the 1972-76 time frame and thereby determine either the continuing need for the activity or any modifications that may be indicated in relation to U.S. policy and strategy for the area.

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